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Investment Opportunities and Barriers
By BASiL J. ScHwAN*
KAYLA J. GILLAN**
I. INTRODUCTION
As the United States disembarks the 1980s Wall Street rollercoaster,
it is difficult to deny that American corporations are facing the critical
task of becoming, and in some cases remaining, competitive in a global
market. To survive this challenge, U.S. companies will have to perform
as they have never before performed. If these companies fail, so too will
their investors. It is therefore imperative for investors in U.S. corpora-
tions to understand the challenge that they face in the coming decade,
and to identify ways in which investments can be both protected and
enhanced. The obstacles which may impede the ability of investors to
protect their interests form the basis of the barriers to which the title of
this paper refers.
HI. PROTECTIVE DEVICES REDUCE
ACCOUNTABILITY
When an employee is underperforming, and corrective actions have
been unsuccessful, simple accountability dictates that the employment
should be terminated. The knowledge that one must be accountable to
another creates the incentive to achieve one's goals. Conversely, if there
are no effective means to monitor, evaluate, or enforce performance stan-
dards, there is no accountability; with the loss of accountability comes
the loss of the incentive to perform.
Applying this theory, it seems obvious that if the management of a
company is not performing as the owners of that company expect, the
management should be replaced. Yet, in practice, the owners of publicly
traded U.S. companies do not have this ability. Our corporations,
through their own structure as well as with help from the government,
have insulated themselves from meaningful accountability. This Article
* Assistant Executive Officer, California Public Employees' Retirement System.
Assistant General Counsel, California Public Employees' Retirement System.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
discusses some of these barriers to management accountability and pro-
poses a few methods for shareholders to overcome them.
A. Poison Pills
The poison pill was the first insulation device to achieve widespread
adoption. Though the poison pill was reportedly first developed only in
1984,1 it was adopted by over six hundred of America's leading compa-
nies within the following five years.2 Although the poison pill began as
an antitakeover device,3 the pill and its progeny have grown far beyond
the takeover context.
The original pills were not fatal-they merely caused discomfort.
For example, the acquisition of control of Crown Zellerbach by Sir James
Goldsmith in 1985 demonstrated a significant shortcoming in the earlier
versions of the pill.' This led to ongoing efforts to increase the pill's
toxicity. Under the most recent version, developed by the law firm of
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, a pill is joined with the issuance of
repurchase rights. These rights, triggered whenever a person acquires
fifty percent or more of the target's outstanding stock, permit their hold-
ers to sell one share of stock back to the target company at twice the
price for which the stock was trading on the date of issuance of the right.
Since the exercise of these repurchase rights involves a cash payment by
the target company, rather than the sale of additional securities at a dis-
count price, the economic effect on the target is much more dramatic. 5
One criticism of poison pills is that they are nearly always adopted
by a board of directors without shareholder consent. Unlike antitakeover
amendments to company charters, pills do n6t legally require share-
holder approval. In response to shareholder complaints about the unilat-
eral adoption of devices that make it difficult to achieve a change of
control which may be desired by the shareholders, the original pills were
restructured to include a shareholder approval component. Under this
1. Martin & Struxness, A Review of Current Developments in Shareholder Rights Plans, 2
MERGERS & AcQuIsITIONs L. REP. 234 (1989).
2. INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, INC., CORPORATE TAKEOVER DE-
FENSES app. A at 1447 (1989). The universe consisted of all companies from the S&P 500,
from the Fortune 500, and from the Forbes and Business Week iC00s.
3. In general, the purpose of the pill is to place control over whether an acquisition goes
forward with the target's board of directors rather than the target's shareholders, "If the
[target's] board does not approve [the deal] and the potential acquirer proceeds with tile bid
anyway, the pill could be 'triggered,' causing actions that would make the target financially
unattractive and/or actions that would dilute the voting power of the potential acquirer," Id.
at x.
4. Martin & Struxness, supra note 1, at 236.
5. Id. at 242.
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rendering, if a bidder satisfies certain procedural requirements, a special
shareholder meeting will be called to determine whether to redeem the
pill and thus permit the acquisition to go forward. This inclusion of
shareholders in the decision-making process, however, is illusory. The
prerequisites for bringing the issue to shareholders are so burdensome6
that the effect of the pills remains unchanged. Boards of directors are
free to determine whether they should turn the company over to some-
one else, regardless of the shareholders' wishes.
As noted, nearly half of America's largest companies have adopted a
poison pill. Now well into their third and fourth generations, pills are so
commonplace that today many corporate executives believe that failure
to have a pill in place is a per se violation of their duty to the corporation.
B. Charter and Bylaw Amendments
Although poison pills are quite common and have acted as a general
deterrent to hostile takeovers, they have not provided an infallible means
of shielding management from potential change. Courts, for example,
have recognized that contests for control create an inherent conflict of
interest for directors, and have therefore more closely scrutinized the
adoption of and the refusal to redeem a pill in the face of a hostile bid."
Alterations to corporate charters have proven to be a more effective
means of avoiding hostile takeovers. Unfortunately, they have also sub-
stantively reduced the shareholders' ability to participate in corporate
governance. For example, classified boards and the absence of cumula-
tive voting restrict the ability of a dissident to take control quickly. With
a classified (or staggered) board, it may take several years before a dissi-
dent can be successful in electing a majority of the directors, even if a
majority of the shareholders support a change of control. Likewise, cu-
mulative voting permits minority holders to elect one or two directors,
while the absence of cumulative voting can make it more difficult to elect
directors outside of the management slate. Thus, both of these devices
are effective means for maintaining the status quo, even if the status quo
is incompetence.
Limiting the shareholders' ability to call special meetings, acting by
written consent, and direct company action by a simple majority vote can
also be effective antitakeover measures. By restricting the opportunity
6. For example, it is burdensome to obtain financing commitments even before it is
known whether the pill will be redeemed or not.
7. See, eg., Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 704 F. Supp. 538 (D. Del.
1988).
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for shareholders to take part in meetings called by management, manage-
ment can control the timing, presentation, and tenor of the deliberations.
Shareholders thereby lose a possible means of encouraging the company
to take a different strategic direction that may enhance shareholder
value.
Dual class capitalization plans with unequal voting rights also tend
to place the interests of incumbent management above those of the share-
holders. These plans are in direct contrast to the American cultural dis-
position towards one person, one vote. The Securities and Exchange
Commission's rule8 restricting such plans was invalidated by an appellate
court in early 1990,1 but that decision is, as of the date of this Article,
still subject to appeal. Additionally, as of the date of this Article, une-




Despite the general effectiveness of the devices described above,
state legislative action aimed at protecting local business and trade inter-
ests has provided the most substantive invasion of shareholders' rights,
all cloaked with the blessing of the government. While under certain
circumstances it has been possible to avoid a poison pill through court
intervention, the only way to avoid state statutes is to obtain a judicial
declaration that the statutes are unconstitutional. Given the great judi-
cial deference that is accorded to state legislatures, this is a heavy and
almost insurmountable task.10
The first state antitakeover law was enacted in Virginia in 1968, and
it inspired thirty-six states to pass similar laws over the next thirteen
years.11 In 1982 however, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Edgar v. MITE,
struck down such a law, concluding that it interfered with interstate
commerce." The Illinois law at issue in Edgar established (as did most
other state laws of this genre) more stringent notification and disclosure
requirements on bidders than did the federal Williams Act.13 Based
upon both the supremacy of federal law and the commerce clause, the
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19-C4 (1990).
9. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
10. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
11. When A State Protects A Company, IssuE ALERT, July-Aug. 1990, at 1.
12. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
13. The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988), added new sections
13(d), 13(e), and 14(d)-(f) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111
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court overturned the Illinois statute.1 4
Between 1982 and 1987 few states adopted protective legislation. In
1987 however, the constitutionality of state action in this area, at least
when limited to corporations with a substantial relationship to the regu-
lating state, was reaffirmed. 15 In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, the Supreme Court reviewed an Indiana state law that, unlike
the Illinois statute overturned in Edgar which merely concerned notifica-
tion and disclosure requirements for bidders, substantively altered the
ability of a bidder to acquire, without the consent of the target company's
board, voting rights to a controlling share of the target company. The
Court upheld the law, determining that it neither interfered with the fed-
eral government's regulation of mergers and acquisitions nor violated the
commerce clause.16 Since the CTS decision, over forty states have en-
acted antitakeover statutes or strengthened existing statutes. 7 As of Sep-
tember 1, 1989, only twelve states and the District of Columbia did not
have some form of protective legislation.' 8
State regulations began with the ostensible purpose of restricting
takeovers that were viewed as harmful to the local economy. For exam-
ple, soon after the CTS decision was announced, Boeing became con-
cerned about a possible fifteen percent acquisition by Mr. T. Boone
Pickens. Boeing turned to the Washington state legislature for help,
which was quickly granted in the form of protective legislation. 19 Boe-
ing, however, was incorporated in Delaware, not Washington. But, be-
cause Boeing accounted for an estimated eight percent of Washington
employment and reportedly had contributed one hundred thirty-one
thousand dollars to local political campaigns the year before, Washing-
ton's new law expressly applied to certain out-of-state companies such as
Boeing.2' Thus, under the rallying cry of protecting local employment,
Washington insulated Boeing from a possible Pickens challenge. Ironi-
cally, it is Delaware, not Washington, that receives Boeing's taxes and
incorporation fees.
(1988). Generally, these provisions require certain disclosures by persons acquiring, or seeking
to acquire, more than 5% of any class of registrant's equity security. 457 U.S. at 627 n.2.
14. 457 U.S. at 630-34, 640-46.
15. CT Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
16. IL at 94.
17. When A State Protects A Company, supra note 11, at 3.
18. INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, INca, STATE TAKEOVER LAWS app.
A at A-6 (1989).
19. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23A.50.010-.900 (repealed 1990).
20. When A State Protects A Company, supra note 11, at 3.
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2. Legislation Restricting Changes of Control
Paralleling the development of corporate protective devices, state
takeover laws have quickly grown beyond the takeover context to be a
comprehensive shield against changes to the corporate status quo. There
are generally seven types of state takeover laws, many of which are used
in combination. Two of these (discussed in Section C.3., infra) redefine
the historic duty of directors to shareholders. The remaining five, dis-
cussed below, focus on changes in control of corporate management.
(a) Control Share Acquisition Statutes
Under these statutes, when a shareholder reaches certain thresholds
of ownership (typically ten percent, thirty-three and one-third percent,
and fifty percent), the shareholder must win the approval of a majority of
the disinterested outstanding shares before exercising the voting rights of
the control share. The bidder must satisfy significant procedural require-
ments before a shareholder meeting will be called to decide the issue of
voting rights.21 Some states (e.g., Minnesota) require greater disclosure
regarding the bidder's plans for the company. Approximately twenty-
two states have adopted a form of the control share acquisition statute.22
Supporters consider this type of provision to be a balanced means of
protecting a company from unwarranted and undesirable hostile take-
overs. Opponents consider it to be a classic entrenchment device since
the practical possibility of bringing the restoration of voting rights issue
to the shareholders is extremely remote (i.e., arriving at a definitive finan-
cial agreement with lenders or financiers is virtually impossible without
having voting rights in the company). Additionally, the costs of pursu-
ing what in effect will be two proxy contests (one to obtain voting rights
and the other to acquire control) is a further deterrent to contests that
could be beneficial to the shareholders' interests. To the extent that
proxy contests are discouraged, management accountability is dimin-
ished. Lastly, more as a matter of principle, opponents contend that the
disenfranchisement of voting power violates the democratic concept of
one person, one vote.
(b) Fair Price Laws
If a bid does not meet certain specified "fairness" criteria (e.g., it
21. These requirements typically include the filing of disclosure statements, including dc-
finitive financing plans, the request for a shareholder meeting, and an agreement to pay the
expenses of the meeting.
22. INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, INC., supra note 18, app. A at A-4.
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cannot be two-tiered), fair price laws dictate that the bid typically must
be approved by a super-majority (usually two-thirds) of the shares not
held by the bidder. While twenty-two states have enacted a fair price
law,' few states have such a law standing alone. In most states, the
fairness criteria applies only after the expiration of a freeze-out waiting
period.
(c) Freeze-Out Laws
If a shareholder acquires a certain threshold amount of outstanding
shares (typically ten percent), then that shareholder may not merge, ac-
quire, or otherwise combine with the company for some extended period
of time (ranging from two to five years). This freeze-out does not apply,
however, if the company's board approved the combination prior to the
acquisition of the threshold amount. Approximately twenty-four states
have enacted this type of law, including Delaware.24 Since Delaware is
the state of incorporation of the vast majority of large U.S. corporations,
this type of law is most prevalent.
Obviously, this type of law is intended to discourage acquirers who
cannot afford to have funds tied up for as long as five years without con-
summating a merger or otherwise gaining control over the target. Be-
cause of the need to obtain board approval before reaching the
designated threshold amount, freeze-out laws have resulted in an increase
in the number of proxy contests by holders of, for example, 9.9 percent of
the company's outstanding stock. It is hoped that by obtaining a few
board seats, board approval will follow and the freeze-out can be
avoided.
(d) Profit Disgorgement
In April 1990 Pennsylvania's governor signed into law what is
widely recognized to be the strongest antitakeover legislation in
America.' One part of this expansive law requires the holder of twenty
percent or more of a company's stock to pay back to the corporation any
profits realized upon the sale of the stock that was held under terms that
the statute characterizes as "short-term."2 6 This provision applies to a
holder of twenty percent of the proxies (when held for purposes of acqui-
sition), but not to any situation in which the stock purchase had prior
approval by both the shareholders and directors.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2571-2575 (1990).
26. Id. § 2574.
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Supporters of this type of provision claim that it will discourage
raiders who simply wish to reap huge profits from short-term holdings by
insincerely putting a company in play. Such raiders buy a large block of
a company's stock, publicly disclose an intent to acquire, and then sell
(or dispose through "greenmail") after the resulting stock price escala-
tion. On the other hand, opponents argue that the scope of this type of
law goes beyond restricting insincere raiders since it imposes huge costs
on any bidder that is unsuccessful in actually acquiring the company.
The supporters' argument takes advantage of the public perception that
all acquirers are raiders bent on destroying the local economy. This type
of provision results in a significant deterrent to all takeover activity-
even that activity which may be necessary to replace inefficient
management.
(e) Labor Protections
A growing number of states27 are adopting a myriad of different
statutes aimed at protecting the labor force in the event of a takeover.
Among these are the requirement that any acquirer honor existing labor
contracts for a specified period, and provide statutory severance pay-
ments for employees terminated as a result of the takeover.
Supporters argue that this approach protects workers, who are most
directly affected by corporate raiders. Additionally, it arguably provides
stability to the corporation by improving morale and assuring continued
productivity-both of which benefit shareholders-during the tenuous
period of a threatened takeover. Opponents argue that the laws represent
an additional cost to takeover activity, which acts as a deterrent to take-
overs that may be preferred by shareholders.
3. Legislation Redefining Corporate Duty
In addition to enacting laws that focus on changes of control, a
number of state legislatures are expanding beyond the context of take-
overs and are substantively altering the relationship between sharehold-
ers and directors. Ironically, these laws are almost universally packaged
with pure antitakeover legislation of the type described above, so that the
extent of the legislative interference in principles of traditional corporate
law often goes unnoticed. Thus far, states have addressed two types of
issues:
27. INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, INC., supra note 18, app. A at A-5;
see also 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2581 (1990).
[Vol. 14
Investment Opportunities and Barriers
(a) The Stakeholder Concept
The mildest form of these new laws merely clarifies that, when con-
sidering the best interests of the corporation, directors may consider both
long and short-term horizons, as well as the impact of decisions on the
local community, employees, and the economy. The strongest version of
these laws, however, permits directors to consider the interests of all
stakeholders (e.g., creditors, suppliers, the community, and employees)
on an equal basis with the interests of shareholders.
In 1983 Pennsylvania's legislature adopted a relatively mild form of
this law.2" Seven years later, however, the legislature strengthened its
law to declare that shareholders form only one aspect of a company's
constituency base, and that no stakeholder's interest is dominant. 9
Thus, any corporate decision justifiable on the basis of some stakeholder
interest will be presumed appropriate.
Representing a possible argument that could be used by other states
attempting to expand their milder stakeholder laws, supporters of the
Pennsylvania legislation claimed that it was merely a clarification of ex-
isting law. Opponents point out, however, that courts have traditionally
held that, while a board may consider a myriad of interests, if there is a
direct conflict, then the long-term interests of shareholders are para-
mount. A letter to Pennsylvania's General Assembly signed by forty-two
professors of law and business noted that "[t]he law's changes in direc-
tors' fiduciary obligations fundamentally undermine century-old tradi-
tions in corporate law, and directly threaten the director-shareholder
relationship."30
In particular, these types of laws appear to repudiate a leading Dela-
ware3 case, Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Ina,32 in
which the court declared it inappropriate to place creditors' interests
over those of shareholders. By allowing other types of interests to take
dominance over shareholders' interests, the Pennsylvania law substan-
tively reduces the rights of shareholders. Since it will always be possible
for directors to point to some group's interests that are being fostered in
any given decision, director accountability is significantly lessened.
28. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 911 (1983) (repealed by 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5911 (1990)).
29. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 511, 1721 (1990).
30. Board Gamer Are Shareholders Getting Ripped Off?, INSIGHT ON THE NEws, July
1990, at 9-10.
31. Delaware cases are routinely relied upon by other states' courts when interpreting
issues of general corporate law.
32. Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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(b) Strengthening of the Business Judgment Rule
American courts have typically afforded great deference to corpo-
rate managers in presuming that their business decisions were appropri-
ately made.33 Applying this business judgment rule, the courts have
determined that, absent situations involving self-dealing or other conflicts
of interest, when a board after reasonable investigation adopts a course of
conduct believed in good faith to be consistent with its fiduciary duty, the
courts will not second-guess that decision.34 However, recent court deci-
sions have imposed a heightened scrutiny of board decisions made in the
context of a contest for control under the rationale that such situations
create a potential conflict of interest.3 5
Some state statutes (e.g., Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania)36 are be-
ginning to strengthen this already strong protection by increasing both
the amount of evidence needed and types of situations that must exist to
overcome the presumption created by the business judgment rule. This
legislation expressly provides that the business judgment rule (and not
the heightened scrutiny standard) applies in situations involving contests
for control, including decisions regarding whether to continue as an in-
dependent corporation, redeem a poison pill, or opt out of the law.37
Further, the Pennsylvania law declares that a decision by disinterested
directors will be presumed to be in the best interests of the corporation,
and that this presumption will be avoided only with clear and convincing
evidence that the decision was not made in good faith.38 These changes
will provide corporate directors with additional insulation from liability,
and thus will further reduce accountability to shareholders.
With fifty different systems of corporate law in the United States,
and with significant taxation and regulatory income to be generated from
attracting businesses, all states are competing in what has been called a
"race to the bottom."' 39 Regardless of who wins this race to provide job
security to corporate managers, shareholders are the losers.
33. See In Re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,194 (Del. Ch. 1989); Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
34. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
35. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
36. INVESTOR RESPONSIBILrrY RESEARCH CENTER, INC., supa note 18, at 11; see also
15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 511, 1721 (1990).
37. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 511, 1721 (1990).
38. Id. §§ 511(f), 1721(g).
39. See, e.g., Fischel, The 'Race to the Bottom' Revisited: Reflections on Recent Develop-
ments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913 (1982).
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M. INVESTOR RESPONSES
Statistics indicate that the ownership of U.S. corporations is becom-
ing increasingly concentrated in institutions, approximately forty-four
percent of which are public and private pension funds."° This trend is
important because pension fund trustees have a fiduciary duty to maxi-
mize trust fund assets, while still operating within the parameters of a
prudent investor.4 How, then, can pension fund trustees reconcile their
duty to maximize with the growing economic evidence that protective
devices such as those discussed have a negative impact on investment
value? 2 With the existence of such devices in any given company
quickly becoming more of a norm than an exception, divesting oneself of
all offending, and hence less profitable, companies is obviously both im-
practical and imprudent.
Members of the Bush administration are also concerned with the
lack of corporate accountability, as it affects the ability of U.S. corpora-
tions to effectively compete for equity in a global market. Both the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of the
Treasury have identified this issue as one of key importance.3
One solution to the corporate accountability problem which has
been adopted by a number of pension funds is to aggressively exert the
shareholders' ownership rights to achieve corporate accountability. Such
a policy merges the pension fund's corporate ownership rights and re-
sponsibilities with its primary duty to the fund's beneficiaries. This is not
a novel approach. As early as 1934 Benjamin Graham and David Dodd,
the founders of fundamental stock analysis, tried to encourage invest-
ment managers to exercise their ownership rights: "The choice of a com-
40. Brancato, Who Owns Corporate America? The Momentum of the Big Investor, DIREc-
TORS & BOARDS, Winter 1990, at 38.
41. See, e-g., 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1990); CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 17.
42. See, ag., S.L. NESBITT, THE IMPACT OF "ANTI-TAKEOVER" LEGISLATION ON
PENNSYLVANIA COMMON STOCK PRICES (1990); Karpoff& Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of
Second-Generation Takeover Legislation, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (1990); ANALYSIS GRoup,
INC., THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF POISON PILLS (1989); Ryngaert & Netter, Shareholder
Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 373 (1988);
Pound, The Effects ofAnti-Takeover Amendments on TakeoverActivit: Some Direct Evidence,
30 J.L. & ECON. 353 (1987); Jarrell & Poulsen, Shark Repellents and Stock Prices, 19 . FIN.
ECON. 127 (1987).
43. See, eg., R. Glauber, Competitiveness in the 1990s and Beyond (Feb. 5, 1990) (state-
ment before Treasurer's Conference, sponsored by the Fimancial Executives Institution); P.
Lochner, Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance (June 14, 1990) (remarks before
the Conference on the Fiduciary Responsibilities of Institutional Investors, New York Univer-
sity); R. Breeden, Acquisitions and Takeovers: What Lies Ahead for Shareholder Rights?
(Apr. 26, 1990) (remarks before the Twelfth Annual Institute on Acquisitions and Takeovers).
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mon stock is a single act; its ownership is a continuing process. Certainly
there is just as much reason to exercise care and judgment in being a
stockholder as in becoming a shareholder." 4
To date, attempts by pension funds to restore accountability have
taken two general forms: those that are company-specific, and those that
are directed more globally toward altering the American corporate
culture.
Although reform on a company-by-company basis is tedious, it can
result in important changes. Historically, when first entering the field of
investor activism, most pension fund trustees have initially focused their
attention on shareholder proposals. These proposals, which are submit-
ted to a recipient company pursuant to procedures prescribed in SEC
rule 14a-8, are limited to certain issues,45 and may sometimes only be
precatory in nature.4' In addition, because the existing proxy process is
designed with a bias in favor of management,47 these proposals are ex-
tremely difficult to pass. The lack of confidential voting and unequal
information and access represent additional hurdles for the proponent
shareholder.
While shareholder proposals rarely pass, the likelihood of their suc-
cess is increasing.4 This enlarged level of support, along with the grow-
ing volume of proposals and the diversity of sponsors, has attracted the
serious attention of many companies. As a result, many corporate man-
agers are willing to voluntarily adopt the more moderate proposals (e.g.,
confidential voting), and are offering other significant concessions to
avoid putting radical proposals to a shareholder vote. For example, in
the 1990 proxy season, both Occidental Petroleum and TRW voluntarily
agreed to permit large shareholders to meet with directors to discuss is-
sues of corporate governance and performance, in exchange for the with-
drawal of a shareholder proposal which would have created a formal and
permanent shareholder advisory committee.49
44. B. GRAHAM & D.L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS 508 (1st cd. 1934).
45. For example, shareholder proposals may not undertake an isue within the company's
ordinary business.
46. Le., be in the form of a recommendation from shareholders to directors.
47. For example, shareholder proposals, combined with their supporting statements, are
limited to 500 words, while the company's opposition is unlimited.
48. During the 1990 proxy season, at least sixteen proposals received the support of the
majority of proxies voting on the issue. This is compared to only three during the 1989 proxy
season. Shareholders Score Unprecedented Victories In 1990, [7 No. 3] CORP. GOVERNANCIP
BULL. 54 (1990).
49. R. Koppes, 1990 Corporate Governance Report 4-5 (July 10, 1990) (memorandum to
members of the California Public Employees' Retirement System Board of Administration).
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Litigation is another company-specific method for challenging cor-
porate behavior. Lawsuits, however, are generally time-consuming, ex-
pensive, ineffective, and largely profitable only for the attorneys.
Additionally, due to recent statutory changes, such as the strengthening
of the business judgment rule, the judicial system provides near-illusory
protection for shareholders.
Direct, informal communications with companies, again on a com-
pany-by-company basis, can be less adversarial than either shareholder
proposals or litigation. Such communications, however, are typically de-
pendent upon the investor and the company's executives having the time
and resources necessary for a face-to-face meeting. If an investor has
holdings in more than a few companies, such meetings can become a
significant drain and test to the investor's resolve. Also, informal meet-
ings may lack the structure of a more institutionalized forum, and agree-
ments that are reached through these informal methods are generally not
subject to enforcement. However, inasmuch as any widespread change in
corporate governance depends upon the attitudes of the individual par-
ticipants, direct communication provides an opportunity for an exchange
of ideas, with the possibility of incrementally altering attitudes.
Direct, company-specific measures would undeniably be more effec-
tive if the company's shareholders could form a cohesive force requiring
management attention. The combined economic power of institutional
investors is extraordinary. Pension funds control assets with an esti-
mated value between 1.5 and 2.6 trillion dollars, and could own as much
as fifty percent of all corporate equity by the year 2000. ° When institu-
tions do agree on an issue, their strength is unquestionable. For example,
though a number of quite active and vocal institutions were unable to
prevent the 1990 adoption of Pennsylvania's antitakeover statute, fear
that these institutions would abandon Pennsylvania corporations led to
an astonishing number of companies opting out of the statute's
protections.51
Such solidarity, however, is a rare achievement. As similar as the
functions of most pension funds are, fund trustees are nevertheless reluc-
tant to combine forces or to entrust decision-making authority to others.
Additionally, limited expertise and resources within the funds themselves
50. The Power of Pension Funds, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 6, 1990, at 154; Light, The Privatiza-
tion of Equity, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 62; America's Shareholders Break Into
the Boardroom, ECONOMIST, Apr. 1989, at 75.
51. At least eighty-five corporations have followed this path. [7 No. 4] CORP. GoVERN-
ANCE BULL. (1990).
1991]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
often prevents trustees from becoming active as often as theory would
dictate.
IV. CONCLUSION
While incremental, company-specific accomplishments may occur,
reform of the corporate system as a whole represents the most effective
means of providing shareholders with the protection they seek. While
members of the SEC have publicly embraced many corporate governance
concepts,52 the SEC's authority to regulate beyond the narrow context of
proxy disclosure is in question given a recent appellate court decision
invalidating the Commission's one share, one vote rule.
53
On the other hand, a federal system of corporate law which estab-
lishes certain minimum levels of accountability beneath which no state
may regulate is an option which would certainly provide the greatest pro-
tection for shareholders against the onslaught of local parochialism.
Such an option may, at a time when the banner of state's rights is firmly
in place, appear politically unlikely in the immediate future. However,
the success of future efforts to lift the barriers that reduce corporate ac-
countability to shareholders will depend upon the federal government
taking a leadership role in curtailing divisive and defensive actions by
state governments. Without such efforts, the global competitiveness that
politicians crave and the equitable treatment which is necessary to attract
investors to the U.S. capital market cannot be achieved.
52. See supra text accompanying note 43.
53. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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